Why Pakistan’s Hangors Submarines Face India’s ASW Shield


    Hangors are effectively ‘dead-on-arrival’ with Pakistanis saddled with deadweights that displace around 3000 tons.
    Last time it was near Vishakhapatnam. This time, barnacles will clog the Hangors in Karachi port itself, points out Dr Abhishek Puri.

    INS Malvan

    IMAGE: The INS Malvan, the second of the Mahe-class Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft (ASW-SWC) ahead of its commissioning into the Indian Navy, July 22, 2026. Photograph: Indian Navy/ANI Photo

    Key Points

    • Pakistan’s Chinese-built Hangor-class submarines are projected to face India’s expanding multi-layered anti-submarine warfare capabilities in the Arabian Sea.
    • India has inducted new ASW shallow water craft, Kamorta-class corvettes, P-8I aircraft and indigenous weapons to strengthen maritime defence.
    • BrahMos coastal batteries positioned along Gujarat’s coastline extend India’s sea-denial capability and increase pressure on hostile naval operations.
    • Operation Sindoor demonstrated India’s ability to establish maritime dominance and restrict Pakistan Navy movements in the Arabian Sea.
    • Geography, logistics, crew adaptation and sustained maritime surveillance are highlighted as major operational challenges for the Hangor-class fleet.

     

    In December 1971, PNS Ghazi, then Pakistan’s most capable long-range submarine, was destroyed off Visakhapatnam. Its wreck still lies on the sea floor collecting barnacles.

    Pakistan has persisted with ‘slow and gradual’ economic harakiri with the new Chinese-built Hangors joining its submarine fleet.

    Not surprisingly, one of the new Chinese-built Hangor-class boats has been named Ghazi (external link) belies either their understanding of sense of history, foolhardiness or perhaps lack of imagination.

    The central thesis is straightforward. Chinese submarines enter a battlespace already saturated by specialised anti-submarine craft, indigenous munitions, land-based strike systems and persistent airborne surveillance which makes them effectively dead on arrival.

    Civilisational Continuity and the Indo-Pacific Shift

    Protecting sea lanes was understood as an extension of the ruler’s duty to secure yogaksema — this is classical statecraft applied to the ocean.

    Chola naval projection into the Bay of Bengal, the Satavahana and Chera maritime networks, and later coastal defence traditions all reflect the same principle: The oceanic approaches to the subcontinent could not be left unguarded.

    This approach now operates under changed strategic conditions. The American navy (and rebranding of the US Indo-Pacific command to the US Pacific command (external link)) has contracted (because of dedollarisation) and Bharat as a de facto net security provider for the entire Indo-Pacific.

    This runs counter to the prevailing Westphalian ‘think-tank analysis’ that relies more on perception/narrative building has now outlived its utility. The author views the rapid build up on Bharatiya Nausena as the contemporary expression of Raj Dharma.

    The hybrid land and ASW Architecture: Ships, Munitions and Steel

    India has moved decisively to dominate the maritime domain with perhaps an unstated shift towards anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The proof is in induction and comissioning: Sixteen ASW craft are under construction or have joined the fleet. INS Arnala (external link) entered service in mid-2025. INS Androth, INS Anjadip, INS Agray, INS Mahe and INS Malvan (external link) followed through in 2025 and 2026 built by Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers in partnership with L&T at Kattupalli and the Cochin Shipyard Limited.

    SAIL produces specialised warship grade (DMR-249A and DMR-249B) alloys at its Bhilai, Bokaro and Rourkela plants forms its structural backbone (external link).

    They will operate alongside the four Kamorta-class dedicated ASW corvettes (external link) already in service and the expanding fleet of P-8I Poseidon aircraft.

    The craft carry torpedoes and advanced decoy systems with mine-laying capability.

    The kill chain from detection to engagement is indigenous (external link).

    Land-based systems extend the denial zone still further. BrahMos coastal batteries (external link) under the Next Generation Maritime Mobile Coastal Battery programme are being positioned at Porbandar and Okha on the Gujarat coast.

    Their range reaches deep into Karachi. Any Pakistani submarine attempting to operate near the coast must contend not only with airborne and surface ASW assets but with shore-based supersonic strike systems.

    Operational Reality for China

    During Operation Sindoor in May 2025 (external link), the Indian Navy forced the Pakistan navy to remain inside harbour or pressed against the Makran coast.

    A carrier battle group and substantial surface forces established a forward posture that denied them any freedom to manoeuvre.

    The same potent architecture defangs the Chinese boats. Geography compounds the problem for Pakistanis.

    The northern Arabian Sea off Karachi remains shallow for a significant distance offshore. A large AIP submarine has limited room to dive or manoeuvre before it enters the sensor envelope of circling P-8Is, ASW craft and supporting assets.

    The first boat’s ceremonial arrival in Karachi (external link) does not change the underlying operational arithmetic.

    The Chinese type 039B design underlying the Hangor-class was optimised for different waters (external link) (Yuan class is an open-ocean submarine designed to conform to PLAN’s defence strategy as per their maritime doctrine and not for operating in Taiwan’s coastal waters).

    It has never been tested against a dense, multi-layered Bharat’s continuous maritime domain awareness. Op Sindoor’s success wasn’t against Pakistan (it’s a sovereign-less state).

    It was a decisive victory over Chinese and Turkish armaments/war fighting doctrines. Despite Pakistan’s rhetoric and glossy Chinese marketing brochures, submarine warfare remains one of the most difficult naval doctrines to master.

    Crew familiarisation with Chinese systems and long-term logistical support remain major vulnerabilities.

    The question, no one is asking in plain terms: Is China ‘dumping’ its weapons systems on Pakistan (external link)? This is a matter of debate for embattled indebted Pakistan.

    The longer strategic picture is consistent. As external (‘western’) naval presence in the Indian Ocean has contracted, the primary task of securing the maritime frontier has returned to India.

    The Hangor-class boats test that capacity. China’s Avic Chengdu Aircraft, manufacturer of J-10 aircraft realised this after their jets spectacularly failed in Op Sindoor (grounded planes are counted as failures).

    If the Wuchang shipbuilding industry group (shipyard making these boats) speaks to its Chinese counterpart, they will probably want to protect their share price.

    Hangors are effectively ‘dead-on-arrival’ with Pakistanis saddled with deadweights that displace around 3,000 tons.

    Last time it was near Vishakhapatnam. This time, barnacles will clog the Hangors in Karachi port itself.

    Feature Presentation: Aslam Hunani/Rediff



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